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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DOMA AND THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT: AN ODD COUPLE
BEGETTING DISFAVORED CHILDREN
ROBERT E. RAINS*
INTRODUCTION
One of the shortest federal public laws in recent years, the 1996 Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA),1 appears to be clear and definite. It has only two
substantive provisions. The first (Section 2 of DOMA), which has received the
most attention, carves out an exception to full faith and credit2 by permitting
states not to give effect to “any public act, record or judicial proceeding of any
other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.”3
The second substantive provision provides in its entirety:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies
of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers
4
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.

This provision is something of an anomaly in federal law; normally the federal
government defers to the states on such domestic relations matters as whether a
couple is legally married for federal purposes.5 For example, to be eligible for
Social Security survivors’ benefits, the claimant must have been validly
married under state law.6 To be counted as a spouse for purposes of

* Professor of Law, Director of Disability Law Clinic, Co-Director of Family Law Clinic, the
Dickenson School of Law of Pennsylvania State University. The author is a member of the
Board of Directors of the National Organization of Social Security Claimants Representatives
(NOSSCR), but the views expressed in this article are his own. He wishes to thank his research
assistant, Ujala Aftab, for her contributions to this project.
1. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
4. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
5. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993).
6. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.345 (2008). See also Everetts v. Apfel, 214 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir.
2000) (recognizing that the Social Security Act defers to state courts); accord Renshaw v.
Heckler, 787 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1986).
811
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Supplemental Security Income (SSI), “you [must be] legally married under the
laws of the State where your and his or her permanent home is (or was when
you lived together).”7 Similarly, federal courts will generally apply state law
to determine marital status for federal tax purposes.8 The same holds true for
immigration purposes (outside of “sham marriages”).9 Federal courts will also
look to state law to determine marital status for applicability of spousal
privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.10
Nevertheless, DOMA constitutes a mandate by Congress that the federal
government not recognize same-sex marriages, even if valid in the state where
they were entered into.11 Congress was initially concerned that the State of
Hawaii might legalize same-sex marriage12 as a result of the then ongoing
litigation in Baehr v. Lewin.13 As set forth in the House Judiciary Committee
Report accompanying DOMA:
Recognition of same-sex “marriages” in Hawaii could also have profound
implications for federal law as well. The word “marriage” appears in more
than 800 sections of federal statutes and regulations, and the word “spouse”
appears more than 3,100 times. With very limited exceptions, these terms are
not defined in federal law.
With regard to the issue of same-sex “marriages,” federal reliance on state
law definitions has not, of course, been at all problematic. Until the Hawaii
situation, there was never any reason to make explicit what has always been
implicit—namely, that only heterosexual couples could get married. And the
Committee believes it can be stated with certainty that none of the federal
statutes or regulations that use the words “marriage” or “spouse” were thought
by even a single Member of Congress to refer to same-sex couples.
But if Hawaii does ultimately permit homosexuals to “marry,” that
development could have profound practical implications for federal law. For
to the extent that federal law has simply accepted state law determinations of
who is married, a redefinition of marriage in Hawaii to include homosexual

7. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1806(a)(1).
8. See, e.g., Lee v. Comm’r, 550 F.2d 1201, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 1977). But note an
exception to apply the “rule of validation” as recognized in Estate of Borax v. Comm’r, 349 F.2d
666, 670 (2d Cir. 1965).
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring qualifying marriage for alien spouse to
comply with laws of place where marriage occurred). See also Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125,
130, 132 (D.D.C. 1978) (recognizing the authority of the states, rather than the INS, to determine
marriage validity outside of fraud).
10. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Panetta, 436
F. Supp. 114, 125 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d, 568 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1978).
11. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
13. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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couples could make such couples eligible for a whole range of federal rights
14
and benefits.

Ironically, while the Baehr litigation was pending, the voters in Hawaii
amended the state constitution to bar same-sex marriages, so such marriages
were never legalized there.15 However, at this writing,16 five states do permit
same-sex couples to marry: Massachusetts (as of 2004);17 Connecticut
(2008);18 Iowa (2009),19 Vermont (2009),20 and New Hampshire (enacted
2009, effective 2010).21 On Dec. 18, 2009, Washington, D.C. Mayor Adrian
Fentry signed Bill 18-482, which legalized same-sex marriage in the District of
Columbia effective March 2010,22 after Chief Justice John Roberts, acting as
circuit justice for the District, refused to issue a stay.23 Additionally,
California permitted same-sex couples to enter into marriage for approximately
six months in 2008,24 during which there were approximately 18,000 such
unions.25 California voters approved Proposition 8 in November 2008,
banning such marriages, and, while the California Supreme Court subsequently
upheld Proposition 8, it also ruled that interim California same-sex marriages
remained valid.26
Beyond the states that permit—or in the case of California, have
temporarily permitted—same-sex couples to marry, there are two other groups
of states whose laws in this area implicate DOMA and Social Security benefits.

14. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, pt. 4, at 10, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2914 (citations
omitted).
15. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 29371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *5–8 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999)
(recognizing constitutional amendment abrogating Baehr v. Lewin).
16. April 2010.
17. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004).
18. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008).
19. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009).
20. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (Supp. 2009). See Vermont Lawmakers Enact Same-Sex
Marriage Bill, 35 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1251 (Apr. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Vermont
Lawmakers].
21. An Act Relative to Civil Marriage and Civil Unions, 2009 N.H. Laws 60 (allowing
persons to marry without regard to gender).
22. See Fate of Same-Sex Marriage in D.C. Rests in Hands of Congress, 36 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 8, at 1095 (Dec. 22, 2009). See also Marriage—Homosexuality—District of
Columbia—Law Takes Effect, 36 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 1215 (Mar. 9, 2010) (noting that
several same sex couples married in D.C. the first day possible under changed law).
23. Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 130 S. Ct. 1279, 1280 (2010).
24. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008).
25. California High Court Upholds Same-Sex Marriage Ban, CNN.COM, (May 27, 2009,
8:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/05/26/california.same.sex.marriage/index.html.
26. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 64, 119 (Cal. 2009). Whether Proposition 8 passes
federal muster is another question. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutionally violates the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses).
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First, there are those states that, while they do not permit same-sex couples to
marry within their jurisdiction, will recognize the validity of a same-sex
marriage entered into elsewhere. New York State falls into this category.27 In
May 2009, prior to allowing same-sex marriages to be performed there, the
Washington, D.C. Council also voted to recognize same-sex marriages from
other jurisdictions.28 In May 2010, the Maryland Department of Budget and
Management announced that it was extending health benefits to the same-sex
spouses of active and retired state employees who were married in another
state.29
Second, there are several states which permit same-sex couples to enter
into variously named forms of legally recognized quasi-marriages. In the
midst of the Baehr v. Lewin litigation, the Hawaii legislature enacted a law in
1997 allowing same-sex couples to become “reciprocal beneficiaries” with
many of the “rights and benefits which are presently available only to married
couples.”30 Similarly, Vermont created “civil unions” for same-sex couples in
199931 after its supreme court ruled that denying such couples the benefits of
marriage violated the state constitution.32 Vermont granted parties to civil
unions “all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law,
whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common
law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.”33
In 2009, when Vermont amended its marriage law to permit same-sex couples
to marry, it also repealed the procedure for such couples to enter civil unions,
allowed existing civil unions to continue, and allowed parties to civil unions to
marry their civil union partners if they so chose.34 In 2004, New Jersey
enacted its “Domestic Partnership Act,” permitting same-sex and opposite-sex
couples to register as domestic partners and obtain some of the rights of
married couples.35 In late 2006, New Jersey enacted a Civil Union Act,
amending the 2004 Domestic Partnership Act.36 Under the Civil Union Act,
27. See Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 337 (N.Y. 2009).
28. See Tim Craig, Uproar in D.C. as Same-Sex Marriage Gains, WASH. POST, May 6,
2009, at A7.
29. Maryland Offers Health Benefits to Workers in Same-Sex Marriages from Other States,
36 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1335 (May 25, 2010).
30. 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 1211. This Act became effective July 1, 1997.
31. An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72–73.
32. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). But see Vermont Lawmakers Enact SameSex Marriage Bill, 35 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1251 (Apr. 7, 2009) (discussing the later
grant to same-sex couples of full marriage rights).
33. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 73 (codified with some differences in language at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, ch. 23 § 1204(a) (2009)).
34. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (Supp. 2009); Vermont Lawmakers, supra note 20, at 1251.
35. Domestic Partnership Act, 2003 N.J. Laws 1, 4.
36. Act of Dec. 21, 2006, 2006 N.J. Laws 1, 3–7 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1–28
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (responding to Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)).
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two eligible individuals of the same sex can enter a civil union and “receive the
same benefits and protections and be subject to the same responsibilities as
spouses in a marriage.”37
It appears certain that the intention of Section 3 of DOMA was to deny
federal marriage-based benefits to same-sex couples, or individual parties to
same-sex couples, in state recognized marriages, reciprocal beneficiary
relationships, civil unions, domestic partnerships, or any otherwise-labeled
state legal status.38 What is far from clear is the effect, if any, of DOMA on
federal benefits for children born or adopted into such legal relationships. The
language from the House Judiciary Committee Report,39 expresses a concern
that if Hawaii permitted homosexuals to marry, this “could make such couples
eligible for a whole range of federal rights and benefits.”40 In a later section,
entitled “H.R. 3396 Advances the Government’s Interest in Preserving Scarce
Government Resources,” the report is even more explicit, but again, only
regarding couples, not their children:
[I]f Hawaii (or some other State) were to permit homosexuals to “marry,”
these marital benefits would, absent some legislative response, presumably
have to be made available to homosexual couples and surviving spouses of
homosexual “marriages” on the same terms as they are now available to
opposite-sex married couples and spouses. To deny federal recognition to
same-sex “marriages” will thus preserve scarce government resources, surely a
41
legitimate government purpose.

Likewise, in his Signing Statement for DOMA, President Clinton made
clear his understanding that Section 3 addressed only federal benefits for
“spouses” in same-sex relationships:
I have long opposed governmental recognition of same-gender marriages
and this legislation is consistent with that position. The act confirms the right
of each State to determine its own policy with respect to same-gender marriage
and clarifies for purposes of Federal law the operative meaning of the terms
“marriage” and “spouse.”
42

This legislation does not reach beyond those two provisions.

While preserving scarce government resources is admittedly a legitimate
government purpose,43 the discretion to grant benefits to some but not to others

37. N.J. STAT. § 37:1–29 (2007). See also id. § 37:1–31 (detailing the rights and
responsibilities of civil union couples).
38. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 31 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2935.
39. See supra text accompanying note 14.
40. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 10, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2914.
41. Id. at 18, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2922.
42. Presidential Statement on Same-Gender Marriage, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1829,
1830 (Sept. 20, 1996).
43. See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986).
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cannot be “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment.”44
The legality of denying federal benefits to state recognized same-sex
spouses is, however, increasingly being challenged. February 2009, Ninth
Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhart issued an order in In re Levenson, directing
that Mr. Levinson’s same-sex California spouse be added to Levenson’s
federal health, dental and vision benefits.45 The benefits-plan administrator
had denied Levenson’s request to add his spouse—made three days after they
were legally married in California.46 Judge Reinhart found that the application
of DOMA to deny benefits to Mr. Levenson’s same-sex spouse violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and could not “survive even
rational basis review.”47 Regarding the government interest in preserving
scarce resources, Judge Reinhart opined:
The denial of health insurance to same-sex spouses may in a comparatively
few cases relieve the government of paying its portion of a family coverage
premium. However, that a government policy incidentally saves the
government an insignificant amount of money does not provide a rational basis
for that policy if the policy is, as a cost-saving measure, drastically
underinclusive, let alone founded upon a prohibited or arbitrary ground. That
rule applies here: There is no rational relationship between the sex of an
employee’s spouse and the government’s desire to limit its employee health
insurance outlays; the government could save far more money using other
measures, such as by eliminating coverage for all spouses; and the application
48
of DOMA in this context sometimes saves the government no money at all.

When Levenson’s same-sex spouse was still not enrolled in his health care
plan after several months because the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
prevented his enrollment, Judge Reinhart entered a subsequent order directing
the office of the Federal Public Defender for the Central District of California
to pay Levenson a monetary award under the Back Pay Act in an amount equal
to the wrongfully denied benefits.49
In March 2009, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) filed suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts directly
challenging the legality of DOMA’s provision denying federal benefits to

44. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 640 (1937)).
45. In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009).
46. Id. at 1146.
47. Id. at 1149.
48. Id. at 1150–51 (citations omitted).
49. In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 937 (9th Cir. 2009). Ninth Circuit Chief Justice Alex
Kozinski entered similar orders on behalf of a staff attorney, Karen Golinski, who had legally
married her same-sex partner in California. In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2009).
Judge Kozinski, however, avoided a direct constitutional challenge to DOMA. Id. at 958.
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same-sex couples married under state law.50 The court found that “DOMA
fail[ed] to pass constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational
basis test.”51 In so finding, the court explained that neither Congress’s
rationales52 nor the government’s justifications53 for DOMA established a
rational relationship between the classification of “marriage” or “spouse” to a
legitimate governmental objective.54 As a result, the court held that DOMA
was in violation of “core constitutional principles of equal protection”55 and it
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.56
In June 2009, President Obama signed a Presidential Memorandum
requesting an increase in benefits to same-sex domestic partners of federal
employees:
For civil service employees, domestic partners of federal employees can be
added to the long-term care insurance program; supervisors can also be
required to allow employees to use their sick leave to take care of domestic
partners and non-biological, non-adopted children. For foreign service
employees, a number of benefits were identified, including the use of medical
facilities at posts abroad, medical evacuation from posts abroad, and inclusion
57
in family size for housing allocations.

In July 2009, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued the U.S.
Departments of Health and Human Services and Veterans Affairs and the
United States of America, asserting that DOMA “interferes with the
Commonwealth’s sovereign authority to define and regulate marriage” and
“constitutes an overreaching and discriminatory federal law.”58 The complaint
cited, among other detriments to same-sex couples, the denial of spousal Social
Security benefits.59 Addressing the claim that DOMA conserves scarce
government resources, the complaint alleged:

50. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
51. Id. at 387.
52. The court listed the purported rationales: “(1) encouraging responsible procreation and
child-bearing, (2) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage, (3)
defending traditional notions of morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources.” Id. at 388.
53. The government’s rationale included “preserving the status quo.” Id. at 390.
54. Id.
55. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387.
56. Id. at 397.
57. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Presidential Memorandum on Fed.
Benefits & Non-Discrimination (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Fact-Sheet-Presidential-Memorandum-on-Federal-Benefits-and-Non-Discrimination.
See also Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,393 (June 22, 2009).
58. Complaint at 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d
234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-11156-JLT).
59. Id. at 12.
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DOMA was also enacted for the purported purpose of preserving federal
resources by denying benefits and entitlements to married individuals in samesex relationships who would qualify for such benefits if they were in a
different-sex relationship. The Congressional Budget Office, however, has
estimated that, if marriages between same-sex couples were recognized in all
fifty states and by the federal government, the federal budget would benefit by
$500 million to $900 million annually. This net benefit is due to estimated
increased revenues through income and estate taxes and decreased outlays for
60
Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid, and Medicare.

The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, and found DOMA
unconstitutional on a number of grounds.61 The court found that DOMA, by
violating the Equal Protection Clause, “impose[d] an unconstitutional
restriction on the receipt of federal funding.”62 Additionally, by defining
marriage in DOMA, Congress “encroache[d] upon the firmly entrenched
province of the state” and thereby ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment.63
The focus on DOMA’s consequences for same-sex couples, while certainly
understandable, obscures the effect on the already tangled law governing
derivative Social Security benefits for children of wage-earners. This article
will first set forth the complex rules for determining who is the dependent child
of an insured wage earner. It then examines the inconsistent application of
those rules to cases involving children conceived using the frozen sperm of
their deceased fathers. This article next addresses the difficult issues that have
arisen in the family law context regarding the legal status of a same-sex
couple’s child who is not the biological or adoptive child of one member of
that couple, and, against that background, analyzes DOMA’s ramifications on
the non-biological, non-adoptive child of one member of a same-sex couple
who dies or becomes eligible for Social Security benefits. Finally, the article
will enunciate a set of basic principles and specific child-oriented reforms to
end the disadvantages faced by certain children of non-traditional families in
securing needed Social Security benefits.
I. BACKGROUND: WHO IS THE DEPENDENT CHILD OF AN INSURED WAGE
EARNER?
The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides monthly benefits,
commonly known as Child’s Insurance Benefits, to the dependent child of an
insured wage earner (an insured) who is disabled, retired, or deceased.64 In the

60.
61.
2010).
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 10–11 (citations omitted).
Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D. Mass.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 253.
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2006).
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ordinary course of events, there is no question as to who is the child of an
insured wage earner. But as in family law, particularly where parents are not,
or were not, married to each other, the SSA may be called upon to adjudicate
legal parenthood as a predicate to a child’s receipt of derivative—also known
as auxiliary—benefits.65 And, as in family law, a child may in some
circumstances be deemed not to be a person’s legal child for Social Security
purposes—even though she is that person’s biological child.66
The Social Security Act contains complex rules for determining who is an
insured’s child67 and when the child is dependent upon a wage-earner.68 A
child under the Social Security Act, includes the “child or legally adopted child
of an individual,” and, in some circumstances, a stepchild or grandchild of an
The SSA’s regulations impose further requirements (or
individual.69
clarifications, depending on one’s point of view) for determining who is an
individual’s child.70 As with the rules governing who is married, these rules
significantly defer to state law.71 A child is the natural child of an insured
wage earner if any one of the following conditions is met:
1. “[The child] could inherit the insured’s personal property as his or her
natural child under State inheritance laws . . .”72
2. “[The child is] the insured’s natural child and the . . . [child’s] mother
or father went through a ceremony which would have resulted in a
valid marriage between them except for a ‘legal impediment’ [that
prevented the marriage from being valid.]”73 Such a legal impediment
will be found if the couple married in good faith, but one of them was
unknowingly still married to someone else at the time of the
ceremony74 or a “defect in the procedure followed.”75

65. See id. § 416(h).
66. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 416(e).
68. Id. § 402(d).
69. Id. § 416(e).
70. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.354–404.358 (2009).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 404.355(a)(1). The U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of inconsistent opinions
in cases challenging state intestacy laws regarding children born out of wedlock. Compare
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537–40 (1971) (holding that Louisiana intestacy laws
precluding illegitimate children from inheritance rights of legitimate children were not in
contravention of due process or equal protection clauses), with Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
776 (1977) (holding that Illinois probate act classifying child inheritance rights based on
illegitimacy denied equal protection), and Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978) (holding that a
New York statute requiring filiation order for illegitimate children to inherit from father did not
violate equal protection).
73. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(2).
74. Id. § 404.346(a). There is considerable and conflicting state law on successive
marriages. Compare Chandler v. Cent. Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649, 654 (Kan. 1993) (finding that
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3. “[The child is] the insured’s natural child and [the child’s] mother or
father has not married the insured, but the insured has either
acknowledged in writing . . . [that the child is his], been decreed by a
court to be [the child’s] father or mother, or been ordered by a court to
contribute to [child] support.”76 However, “[i]f the insured is deceased,
the acknowledgement, court decree, or court order must have been
made or issued before his or her death.”77
4. Where the child’s biological parent has not married the insured, and the
child cannot furnish evidence of an acknowledgement, court decree or
court order, the child may produce other evidence to demonstrate his or
her status as the child of the insured. However, in this circumstance,
the child must also “show that the insured was either living with [the
child] or contributing to [the child’s] support at the time [the child]
applied for benefits,” or, “if the insured [was] not alive at the time . . .
[the child] must have evidence to show that the insured was either
living with . . . or contributing to [the child’s] support” at the time the
insured died.78
Under certain circumstances, a legally adopted child may be awarded
benefits as the child of the insured.79 Again, the SSA looks to the law of the
state (or foreign country if the adoption took place there) to determine the
validity of an adoption.80 Likewise, under certain circumstances, a stepchild
may receive benefits if, after his or her birth, the natural or adopting parent
married the insured.81 The SSA will look to state law to determine the validity
of the marriage,82 unless of course, it is a same-sex marriage which DOMA
prevents the SSA from recognizing.83 In limited circumstances, benefits may

burden is on spouse from earlier marriage to overcome presumption of validity of later marriage),
with Estate of Henry, 353 A.2d 812, 813–14 (Pa. 1976) (finding that “presumption of continuance
of prior marriage prevails unless facts are shown which have the effect of overcoming this
presumption”).
75. 20 C.F.R. § 404.346(a). Compare Accounts Mgmt., Inc. v. Litchfield, 576 N.W.2d 233,
235 (S.D. 1998) (holding that failure to record marriage license did not render marriage void),
with Ravenal v. Ravenal, 338 N.Y.S.2d 324, 328 (1972) (holding that marriage ceremony
performed by someone other than a clergyman or minister rendered such marriage void).
76. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(3). What will constitute a legally acceptable acknowledgment of
paternity may be a contentious issue. See, e.g., Lalli, 439 U.S. at 266–67.
77. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(3). For an extreme example of a paternity order entered decades
after the father’s death, see Harris v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 767 So. 2d 181 (Miss.
2000).
78. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(4).
79. Id. § 404.356.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 404.357.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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also be available to an insured’s grandchild or step-grandchild,84 or equitably
adopted child.85
For each of these categories of children, there are somewhat different rules
for determining dependency on the insured, which is a necessary element for
receipt of benefits.86 The following section of this article discusses cases
involving children conceived after the death of their father, illustrating the
difficulties inherent in applying state law to federal benefits, especially where
state and federal statutes simply do not address new reproductive technologies.
These cases also provide the necessary background for understanding how
DOMA may harm children brought into non-traditional families in nontraditional ways.
II. THE SSA AND CHILDREN CONCEIVED AFTER THE DEATH OF A PARENT
A.

Judith Hart (Louisiana)

A decade before enactment of DOMA, advances in artificial reproductive
technology already presented challenges to the SSA in applying the Social
Security Act to situations which Congress had surely not envisioned when it
drafted the relevant statutory language. The first such case to draw national
publicity was that of Judith Hart, the biological child of Nancy Young Hart and
Edward W. Hart Jr.87 Judith was conceived by gamete intrafallopian transfer
three months after her father’s death.88 The Harts had been married for four
years, a time during which they tried unsuccessfully to conceive.89 In 1990,
Edward was diagnosed with esophageal cancer.90 After receiving the
diagnosis, but before starting chemotherapy, Edward had a sperm sample taken
and frozen for the specific purpose of having Nancy later impregnated with his
child.91 Edward died within a few months, and, after his death, Nancy utilized

84. 20 C.F.R. § 404.358.
85. Id. § 404.359.
86. Id. §§ 404.360–404.365.
87. Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security
Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 251 (1999).
See also Mark Curriden, A Dad for Judith Hart: Judge Says Child Eligible for Benefits, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1995, at 30, 30 [hereinafter Curriden, A Dad for Judith Hart]; Mark Curriden, No Benefits
for “Miracle” Baby: Suit by Artificially Inseminated Mother Seeks Reversal, A.B.A. J., Mar.
1995, at 18, 18 [hereinafter Curriden, No Benefits]; Joseph Wharton, “Miracle” Baby Denied
Benefits, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 38, 38 [hereinafter Wharton, Miracle Baby]; Joseph Wharton,
Social Security Case Settled, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 40, 40 [hereinafter Wharton, Social
Security].
88. Banks, supra note 87, at 251.
89. Curriden, No Benefits, supra note 87, at 18.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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the frozen sperm.92 Judith was the happy result, born on June 4, 1991, ten days
short of a year after Edward’s death.93 Under the law of Louisiana (Judith’s
state of birth), Judith was considered to be an illegitimate child because she
was born more than 300 days after the dissolution of her parents’ marriage
caused by her father’s death.94 As an illegitimate child, Judith had to prove
filiation within one year of the death of her father; but Nancy was unable to file
within the statute of limitations because she was recovering from childbirth
and had not yet received a birth certificate for Judith.95 Also, under
Louisiana’s laws, Judith did not qualify as an heir of her father for intestacy
Furthermore, Judith could not show that Edward had
purposes.96
acknowledged her, prior to his death, as his biological daughter.97
In 1992, Nancy Hart applied to the SSA for Judith to receive survivor’s
benefits on Edward’s account.98 The SSA rejected her claims.99 A Social
Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) subsequently reversed the denial and
directed that Judith, and therefore Nancy, receive survivor’s benefits.100
Unfortunately for Judith, the SSA’s Appeals Council reopened the case on its
own motion101 and reversed the ALJ, thus reinstating the SSA’s denial of
benefits.102 Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Nancy Hart filed
suit on behalf of Judith in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.103 However, that court never issued a ruling on Judith’s
status as the child of Edward Hart for SSA purposes. Rather, in March 1996,
the Commissioner of the SSA, Shirley Chater, moved for a voluntary remand,
announcing that the SSA would pay Judith survivor’s benefits.104 In so doing,
Commissioner Chater stated:
This case raises significant policy issues that were not contemplated when the
Social Security Act was passed many years ago. . . . Resolving these
significant policy issues should involve the executive and legislative branches,
105
rather than the courts.

92. Banks, supra note 87, at 251; Curriden, No Benefits, supra note 87, at 18.
93. Banks, supra note 87, at 251–52.
94. Id. at 252.
95. Id. It is, of course, possible that Nancy was simply unaware of the ten-day limitation she
faced or that she was overwhelmed by the events surrounding childbirth. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 253.
98. Banks, supra note 87, at 251–52.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 254.
101. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (2009); Banks, supra note 87, at 254.
102. Banks, supra note 87, at 254.
103. Id. at 255.
104. Id. at 255–56; Wharton, Social Security, supra note 87, at 40.
105. Wharton, Social Security, supra note 87, at 40.
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As will be seen, more than a decade later, the legislative and executive
branches have not resolved those issues, and by default they continue to be
adjudicated by the courts under a statute that SSA admits was not drafted in
contemplation of those issues.106 Not only has Congress failed to update the
Social Security Act to address modern reproductive technologies, but the
states, by-and-large, have generally failed to make adjustments in their laws.107
Nor have subsequent Social Security commissioners acted so generously
toward children conceived by non-traditional methods, as did Commissioner
Chater. The result has been a definite “mixed bag” for such children.
B.

Amanda and Elyse Kolacy (New Jersey)

In a case tragically similar to that of the Hart family, Mariantonia and
William Kolacy were a young married coupled in New Jersey trying to
conceive when William was diagnosed in 1994 with leukemia.108 William
Despite
provided two sperm samples, which Mariantonia banked.109
chemotherapy, William died in 1995 at the age of 26.110 Almost exactly a year
later, in accordance with her late husband’s wishes,111 Mariantonia used his
sperm and her eggs at Cornell’s infertility clinic to create embryos that were
implanted in her.112 The result was the birth of Amanda and Elyse Kolacy in
November 1996, more than 18 months after their father’s death.113 Thereafter,
Mariantonia applied to the SSA for dependent child benefits for Amanda and
Elyse on William’s account.114
The SSA denied the twins’ claim, and a Social Security ALJ affirmed that
denial in a written opinion in November 1999.115 Mariantonia then brought
suit in New Jersey state court seeking a declaratory judgment that Amanda and
Elyse have the status of William’s intestate heirs.116 Because Mariantonia
asserted, inter alia, that the New Jersey Parentage Act was unconstitutional,

106. Id.
107. See Robert E. Rains, What the Erie “Surrogate Triplets” Can Teach State Legislatures
About the Need to Enact Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1,
3 (2008).
108. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1263.
112. Id. at 1258.
113. Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1258.
114. Id. at 1259.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1258.
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the New Jersey Attorney General appeared to defend the statute.117 Neither the
SSA nor its Commissioner was a party to the proceedings.118
Unlike the Hart case, the Kolacy case proceeded to a decision on the
merits. Judge Stanton recognized that there was no New Jersey precedent
governing whether a child conceived after the death of her biological father,
and born more than 18 months after his death, is his legal heir.119 The New
Jersey Statute provided in relevant part: “Relatives of the decedent conceived
before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the
lifetime of the decedent.”120 Mirroring the Commissioner of the SSA’s
comments about the Social Security Act, Judge Stanton acknowledged that the
New Jersey legislature “was not giving any thought whatever to th[is] kind of
problem” when it enacted the intestacy provision.121 While recognizing “[i]t
would undoubtedly be useful for the Legislature to [address] . . . the issues
presented by reproductive technology,” Judge Stanton nevertheless declined
the state attorney general’s invitation to abstain from deciding the case on the
merits.122 The judge likewise declined Mariantonia’s invitation to hold the
statute unconstitutional.123 Rather, Judge Stanton reasoned that the intent of
the law was to include children—such as the twins—where it was clear that
they were the biological children of the deceased parent and that the deceased
parent had “unequivocally expressed his desire that [the mother] use his stored
sperm after his death to bear his children.”124
I discern a basic legislative intent to enable children to take property from their
parents and through their parents from parental relatives. Although the
Legislature has not dealt with the kind of issue presented by children such as
Amanda and Elyse, it has manifested a general intent that the children of a
decedent should be amply provided for with respect to property passing from
him or through him as the result of a death. It is my view that the general
intent should prevail over a restrictive, literal reading of statutes which did not
125
consciously purport to deal with the kind of problem before us.

117. Id.
118. Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1258.
119. Id. at 1260.
120. Id. (quoting N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B: 5-8). After the decision in Kolacy, the New Jersey
legislature amended this section on “after born heirs” to read as follows: “An individual in
gestation at a particular time is treated as living at the time if the individual lives 120 hours or
more after birth.” 2004 N.J. Laws 1442 (codified at N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B:5-8 (2004)). Under
this test, Amanda and Elyse were “living” less than eighteen months after William’s death.
121. Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1261.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1260.
124. Id. at 1262–63.
125. Id. at 1262.
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Accordingly, Amanda and Elyse were the legal heirs of William Kolacy under
the intestacy laws of New Jersey.126 Given that conclusion by the New Jersey
court, this would make Amanda and Elyse entitled to survivor’s benefits as the
dependent children of the wage-earner, William.127
C. The Woodward Twins (Massachusetts)
In another case eerily similar to the fact patterns in Hart and Kolacy,
Lauren Woodward and her husband, Warren, were a childless couple in
Massachusetts when he was diagnosed with leukemia in January 1993.128 The
Woodwards banked Warren’s sperm and he then underwent a bone marrow
transplant.129 Nevertheless, Warren died in October 1993, and Lauren was
Subsequently, Lauren
appointed the administratrix of his estate.130
successfully conceived using Warren’s stored sperm and later gave birth to
twin girls in October 1995.131
In January 1996, Lauren applied to the SSA for children’s benefits for the
twins and mother’s benefits for herself, as survivors of the wage-earner,
Warren.132 The SSA rejected these claims on the grounds that the twins were
not Warren’s children under the Social Security Act.133
In February 1996, while pursuing her appeals within the Social Security
administrative system, Lauren filed an action in the state Probate and Family
Court “for correction of birth record.”134 Acting in dual capacities as: 1)
wife/mother and 2) administratrix of the estate, Lauren filed a stipulation of
“voluntary acknowledgement of parentage.”135 Based on this stipulation, the
Probate Court judge entered a judgment of paternity and an order to amend
both birth certificates declaring the deceased Warren to be the twins’ father.136
Notwithstanding the judgment of paternity and amended birth certificates,
a Social Security ALJ affirmed the denial of benefits, finding that the
Massachusetts intestacy and paternity laws precluded the twins’ inheritance
from Warren.137 After the SSA’s Appeals Council denied review, Lauren filed
a complaint seeking judicial review in the United States District Court for the

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1263–64.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.355(a)(1), 404.361(a).
Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260.
Id.
Id. at 260–61.
Id.
Id. at 261.
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District of Massachusetts.138 That court certified the following question to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC):
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to be withdrawn from the
husband for the purpose of artificially impregnating the wife, and the woman is
impregnated with that sperm after the man, her husband, has died, will children
resulting from such pregnancy enjoy the inheritance rights of natural children
139
under Massachusetts’ law of intestate succession?

To this question the Massachusetts SJC responded with a “definite maybe.”140
The court rejected both Lauren’s position that posthumously conceived
children must always be allowed to inherit from their biological parent by
virtue of their genetic connection and the SSA’s position that such children can
never inherit because they were not “in being” prior to the parent’s death.141
The court noted that the Massachusetts intestacy statute, unlike those of
Louisiana and North Dakota, has no requirement that a successor must exist at
the death of the decedent.142
The court recognized that the case implicates three important State
interests: the best interests of children, the orderly administration of estates,
and the reproductive rights of the deceased genetic parent.143 Clearly it is in
the best interest of posthumously conceived children to receive monetary
support from their parents’ estates.144 However, such rights necessarily
conflict with the rights of the deceased’s other children.145 The intestacy
statute promotes the orderly administration of estates by requiring “certainty of
filiation” and creating limitation periods for actions against the intestate
estate.146 Because death of one spouse necessarily terminates a marriage,
“posthumously conceived children are always nonmarital.”147 Although the
Massachusetts intestacy laws have a one-year period for commencing paternity
claims, the certified question did not include the timeliness of the twins’
claims.148
Regarding the state’s interests to honor the reproductive choices of
individuals, the court concluded that “donor parent must clearly and

138. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 261.
139. Id. at 259.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 262.
142. Id. at 264 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 939 (West 2000); see also N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. 14-18-04 (Michie 1997)). The Louisiana statute, effective July 1, 1999, was not in
existence at the time of the birth of Judith Hall. See discussion supra Part II.A.
143. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265–68.
144. Id. at 265.
145. Id. at 266.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 266–67.
148. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 267–68.
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unequivocally consent not only to posthumous reproduction but also to the
support of any resulting child.”149 Despite using the language “clearly and
unequivocally,” the court explicitly declined to explicate “what proof would be
sufficient.”150 Indeed, it seems unlikely that a young man under a death
sentence of terminal illness, trying to make it possible for his wife to carry his
child after his death, would ordinarily be making explicit plans to support such
a child from the next world. And, even though there is a certain logic to the
court’s conclusion that such a child is non-marital if conceived after the death
of the father, both husband and wife might well assume to the contrary—if
they thought about the matter at all.
The SJC thus found that mere genetics are not sufficient to establish legal
parentage and left the question to the district court for further evaluation after
Mrs. Woodward presented evidence of Warren’s intent.151 Finally, the SJC
rebuked the Probate and Family Court judge for entering the paternity
judgment and amending the twins’ birth certificates without giving notice to
every other interested party, including potential heirs.152
D. Juliet and Piers Netting (Arizona)
In yet another case with starkly similar facts, Rhonda Gillett-Netting filed
a claim for survivor’s benefits for her twins, Juliet and Piers Netting.153
Rhonda and Robert were a married couple in Arizona, trying to conceive,
when he was diagnosed with cancer in December 1994.154 He delayed the start
of therapy in order to deposit his sperm, which was cryogenically preserved.155
Despite chemotherapy, Robert died on February 4, 1995.156 Before he died,
Robert confirmed that he wanted Rhonda to have his child using his frozen
sperm.157 Rhonda underwent in vitro fertilization in December 1995, and gave
birth to the twins on August 6, 1996.158
149. Id. at 269.
150. Id. at 270.
151. Id. at 271. In this regard, the Massachusetts SJC misconceived the function of a federal
district court reviewing a denial of Social Security benefits. The reviewing federal court does not
take additional evidence. See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2004). It
only reviews the administrative record made below. Id. If the record is incomplete, it may
remand the case and “order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social
Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is
good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006).
152. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 271.
153. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 595.
158. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
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In one potentially significant regard, this case was factually different from
the three preceding ones. Robert, who was 59 years old at the time of his
marriage to Rhonda in 1993, had three children from a prior marriage.159
Rhonda filed for children’s benefits for the twins in August 1996 based on
Robert’s earnings record, and the SSA rejected that claim.160 At the third
administrative level, a Social Security ALJ ruled that the twins were not
dependent on Robert, because, “the last possible time to determine dependents
[sic] on the wage earner’s account is the date of the death of the wage
earner.”161 After losing the claim before the SSA’s Appeals Council, Rhonda
filed for judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona.162 She asserted that the twins were Robert’s surviving, dependent
children, and that denying them that status violated their equal protection
rights.163 District Court Judge Roll rejected these claims.164
First, Judge Roll reasoned that one’s biological children are not necessarily
one’s “children” for purposes of the Social Security Act.165 He linked being
the child of a wage-earner with the ability to inherit from the wage-earner
under the state’s intestacy laws.166 As Judge Roll interpreted Arizona’s
intestacy laws, the twins could not inherit since they were neither born nor in
gestation when Robert died.167 Although this conclusion foreclosed benefits
under the Social Security Act, Judge Roll went on to address whether the twins
were dependent upon Robert.168 He acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court stated in Mathews v. Lucas,169 “a child who is legitimate . . . is
considered to have been dependent at the time of the parent’s death,” 170 and

159. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963–64 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev’d, 371
F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
160. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 964.
164. Id. at 967.
165. Id. at 965.
166. Id. at 965.
167. Id. (interpreting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108).
168. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 967.
169. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 499–500 (1976).
170. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (quoting Lucas, 427 U.S. at 499–500). In Lucas,
the Supreme Court upheld—against an equal protection challenge—the Social Security Act’s
requirement that certain illegitimate children show that the deceased wage earner was their parent
and, at the time of his death, was living with those children or contributing to their support.
Lucas, 427 U.S. at 515–16 (1976).
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that “Arizona law treats all children as legitimate by statute.”171 Nevertheless,
he concluded that the twins were not dependent on Robert.172
Finally, applying the rational basis test, Judge Roll concluded that denying
the twins dependent child status and hence survivors’ benefits did not violate
their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.173
Relying on Lucas, he found that the Social Security Act’s “purpose in
providing survivor’s benefits . . . is to replace the unanticipated lost support
resulting from the decedent’s death.”174 He reasoned that since Robert died
before the twins were conceived, they suffered no unanticipated lost support.175
It is, frankly, difficult to perceive where Judge Roll found the requirement
that the loss of income be unanticipated. The passage in the Lucas decision to
which Judge Roll refers does not support such a requirement. Rather, the
Court in Lucas cited the “legislative history [which] indicat[ed] that the statute
was not a general welfare provision for legitimate or otherwise ‘approved’
children of deceased insureds, but was intended just ‘to replace the support lost
by a child when his father . . . dies.’”176 Based on this legislative history, the
Lucas Court concluded: “Taking this explanation at face value, we think it
clear that conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is not
impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those children for whom
the loss of the parent is an immediate source of the need.”177
Judge Roll’s requirement that a loss of parental income be unanticipated
simply does not withstand scrutiny. If a woman purposefully were to get
pregnant by her terminally ill husband, knowing he was not even expected to
live to see the child born, the resulting child would unquestionably be entitled
to survivor’s benefits if the father was an insured wage-earner.178 Additionally
a wage earner who has already stopped working and is receiving Social

171. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-601).
172. Id. at 967 (determining that the Arizona statute was meant to address the legitimacy
children born to unwed couples and did not apply to the case at bar).
173. Id. at 970.
174. Id. (citing Lucas, 427 U.S. at 507).
175. Id.
176. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 507 (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-404, pt. 10 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2050).
177. Id.
178. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.355, 404.361(a) (2010).
[T]he primary purpose of [Social Security child’s benefits] is to provide support for
dependents of a disabled wage earner. . . . Under [the Social Security Administration’s]
view the Act’s purpose would be to replace only that support enjoyed prior to the onset of
disability; no child would be eligible to receive benefits unless the child had experienced
actual support from the wage earner prior to the disability, and no child born after the
onset of the wage earner’s disability would be allowed to recover. We do not read the
statute as supporting that view of its purpose.
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974).
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Security Disability Insurance benefits can have a child who is immediately
eligible for child’s benefits on that parent’s account.179 In either of these
situations, benefits are payable even though there was nothing unanticipated
about the parent’s loss of income. Indeed, had Rhonda conceived using
Robert’s preserved sperm the day before he died, the resulting child
unquestionably would have been an eligible survivor.
In a rather brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed.180 As had prior courts,
the Ninth Circuit noted that “[d]eveloping reproductive technology has
outpaced federal and state laws.”181 Neither the Social Security Act nor
Arizona family law clarified the twins’ status.182 Nevertheless, by virtue of the
fact that the twins were Robert’s biological children and their paternity was
undisputed, they were his children under the Social Security Act for purposes
of survivor’s benefits.183 Furthermore, because all children under Arizona
family law are deemed to be legitimate and the Social Security Act equates
legitimacy with dependency, the twins were Robert’s dependent children.184
As Robert’s dependent children, they were statutorily entitled to survivor’s
benefits, which rendered their equal protection claim moot.185
It is worthwhile to pause here and note a critical distinction between
Arizona law and Massachusetts’s law. In Woodward, the Massachusetts SJC
had been clear that the Woodward twins were “nonmarital” children because
they were conceived after their father’s death.186 In Gillett-Netting, the Ninth
Circuit found that those twins were “legitimate” under Arizona law.187 The
Gillett-Netting Court never addressed whether the twins were marital or
nonmarital children. Nevertheless, in a footnote, the court suggested that if a
sperm donor had not been married to the mother, a resulting child would have
to show actual dependency on the sperm donor father to be entitled to
survivor’s benefits on his earnings record.188 Hence, implicitly at least, the
Ninth Circuit deemed the Gillett-Netting twins to be marital children.189
179. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a) (2010).
180. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2004).
181. Id. at 595.
182. Id. at 595–96.
183. Id. at 597.
184. Id. at 598.
185. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594 n.1.
186. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 262 (Mass. 2002).
187. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598.
188. Id. at 599 n.7.
189. In response to Gillett-Netting, the SSA issued an acquiescence ruling, AR 05-1(9), that
applies only to the Ninth Circuit. SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005).
SSA noted its disagreement with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, but directed its adjudicators within
that circuit as follows:
In a claim for survivor’s benefits, we will determine that a biological child of an
insured individual who was conceived by artificial means after the insured’s death is the
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Robert Stephen (Florida)

Robert Stephen was the posthumously conceived child of Floridians
Michelle Stephen and her deceased husband Gar Stephen.190 Michelle and
Gar’s marriage was short-lived; they wed on October 25, 1997, and he died of
a heart attack on November 17, 1997.191 The following day, Michelle “had
Gar’s sperm extracted from his deceased body and cryo-preserved.”192 There
was no indication that Gar had pre-approved the post-mortem extraction of his
sperm, nor that he left a will.193
Michelle became pregnant after multiple fruitless attempts at in vitro
fertilization, and gave birth to Robert on June 20, 2001.194 Michelle and Gar
were listed as Robert’s parents on his birth certificate.195
In April 2002, Michelle filed an application with the SSA for Robert to
receive surviving child’s benefits on Gar’s account.196 The SSA turned down
this claim both initially and on reconsideration; at the third administrative
level, an ALJ affirmed the denial.197 Applying Florida law, the ALJ reasoned
that Robert was not Gar’s dependent child as he could not inherit from Gar

insured’s “child” for purposes of the Act. We will not apply section 216(h) of the Act in
determining the child’s status. In addition, if such child is considered legitimate under
State law, we will consider the child to be the insured’s “legitimate” child and thus
deemed dependent upon the insured for purposes of section 202(d)(3) of the Act. All of
the States and jurisdictions within the Ninth Circuit, except Guam, have eliminated
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children. These States allow all children
the same rights which flow between parents and their children, regardless of the parents’
marital status. A child acquires these rights if he establishes that an individual is his
parent under State family law provisions. Accordingly, if all other requirements are met,
adjudicators will consider such child entitled to child’s benefits under section 202(d).
Id. at 55,657.
190. Stephen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
191. Id.
192. Id. This is reminiscent of the famous English case of Diane Blood. Regina v. Human
Fertilisation & Embryology Auth. (Ex Parte Blood), [1999] Fam. 151 (Eng.). After Diane’s
husband, Stephen, contracted meningitis, doctors removed two sperm samples from his comatose
body by “electro-ejaculation.” Id. at 172. Stephen Blood, who had never given consent for the
extraction of his sperm, died shortly thereafter. Id. at 172–73. Britain’s Human Fertilisation [sic]
and Embryology Authority prevented Diane Blood from using the sperm to impregnate herself in
Britain, but she ultimately won the right under the European Community Treaty to take the sperm
to Belgium where she was treated and had two successful pregnancies. See Diane Blood
Pregnant Again, BBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2002, 9:39 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
england/1809296.stm.
193. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
194. Id. at 1259.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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under Florida’s law of intestate succession,198 and Gar had not provided for
Robert in a will.199 The Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s decision, and
Michelle appealed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.200
The district court conceded that under Florida law, Robert was Gar’s
genetic and legitimate child.201 But, those conclusions did not necessitate that
Robert be Gar’s child under the Social Security Act, so as to be eligible to
receive survivor’s benefits.202 The court concluded that Robert was not
dependent upon Gar at the time of Gar’s death.203 The court noted that Robert
was not born until three years after Gar died.204 Further, the court found that
Robert was not even Gar’s child within the meaning of the Social Security Act;
as a posthumously conceived child, he was not eligible to make a claim against
Gar’s estate absent such provision in a will.205 The court observed that “this
case would have been more difficult had Gar left a will that provided for ‘any
child of mine’ or ‘any issue of mine’ without defining ‘child’ or ‘issue.’”206
Finally, the court distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s decision in GillettNetting.207 Whereas Gillett-Netting had been decided under Arizona law,
which did not deal specifically with posthumously conceived children, Florida
law did specifically address such children.208 The pertinent section of Florida
law provided:
A child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died
before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body
shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child
209
has been provided for by the decedent’s will.

In the absence of a will executed by Gar, Robert had no claim against Gar’s
estate under Florida law.

198. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1264 (citing FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (enacted May 14, 1993, effective May 15, 1993,
as amended 1998)).
202. Id. at 1264–65.
203. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. The Social Security Act requires that the child be
dependent at the time of the insured’s death. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C).
204. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1265 n.10.
207. Id. at 1265 (citing Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004)).
208. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 742.17(4) (1998)).
209. FLA. STAT. § 742.17(4) (2005).
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Christine Khabbaz (New Hampshire)

Donna Eng and Rumzi Khabbaz married in 1989 and had a son six years
later.210 In April 1997, Rumzi was diagnosed with a terminal illness and began
to bank his sperm so that Donna might be able to conceive another child by
him.211 Indeed, he executed a consent form to that effect, stating his “desire
and intent to be legally recognized as the father of the child to the fullest extent
allowable by law.”212 Rumzi died in May 1998.213 One year later, Donna
conceived using his banked sperm.214 She gave birth to Christine Rumzi in the
summer of 2000.215
Donna applied to the SSA for survivor’s benefits for Christine, but the
SSA denied that claim.216 After losing at all administrative levels, Donna
sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of
New Hampshire, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire: “Is a child conceived after her father’s death via artificial
insemination eligible to inherit from her father as his surviving issue under
New Hampshire intestacy law?”217
The New Hampshire Supreme Court responded in the negative.218 As
framed by that court, the key question under New Hampshire’s laws governing
estate distribution was whether Christine was Rumzi’s “surviving issue.”219
The court looked to the dictionary definition of “surviving” as meaning
“remaining alive or in existence.”220 Since Christine was neither alive nor in
existence when Rumzi died, she was not his “surviving issue.”221 Donna’s
alternative arguments for bringing Christine under New Hampshire’s estatedistribution laws were unpersuasive to the court, which expressed its concern
that making estates wait for the potential birth of a posthumously conceived
child would wreak havoc with the statutory scheme.222 In contradistinction to
Massachusetts law as articulated in Woodward,223 New Hampshire law deemed

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Khabbaz v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1183.
Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1183–84 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 2303 (2002)).
221. Id. at 1184.
222. Id. (finding the scheme designed to determine “surviving issue” could not function
where banked sperm could create additional issue after death).
223. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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that Christine’s parents were “not ‘unwed’” despite the fact that Rumzi was
dead when Christine was conceived; thus, she was the child of married parents
and was not illegitimate.224 As in Massachusetts, the New Hampshire justices
called on the state legislature to study and address the complex questions
surrounding new reproductive technologies.225
After the New Hampshire Supreme Court handed down its decision, the
parties stipulated in the federal court action to the entry of judgment in favor of
the Commissioner.226
G. Baby Boy Finley (Arkansas)
Amy and Wade Finley, Jr. married in October 1990.227 They pursued
fertility treatments at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, and, in
June 2001, doctors produced ten embryos using their gametes.228 Two
embryos were implanted into Amy, but she later had a miscarriage.229 Four
were frozen for preservation.230 In July 2001, Wade died intestate in
Arkansas.231 In June 2002, Amy was implanted with two of the remaining
embryos, resulting in a single pregnancy.232 She gave birth to a boy on March
4, 2003, roughly twenty months after Wade’s death.233 A few weeks before
the child was born, Amy obtained an order from the Lonoke County Circuit
Court that, upon the baby’s delivery:
[T]he State Registrar of the Arkansas Department of Health, Division of Vital
Records, shall enter and state upon the certificate of birth that Wade W. Finley,
Jr., now deceased, is the father of [W.F.]; [a]nd that, thereafter, all State and
Federal Agencies, of the United States of America, shall uphold the findings of
this Court’s conclusion of paternity—in [Plaintiff] the mother and Wade W.
Finley, Jr. the father—for any and all lawful purposes; and, that [W.F.] is the
legitimate child of [Plaintiff] and Wade W. Finley, Jr. for any and all lawful
234
purposes.

A month after the birth of the child, Amy filed for mother’s insurance
benefits for herself and child’s insurance benefits for the child, based on

224. Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1185.
225. Id. at 1186 (citing Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass.
2002)).
226. Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1110 n.32 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (citing Kabbaz v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007)).
227. Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Ark. 2008).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. The four embryos remaining from the original ten were not preserved. Id. at 850 n.3.
231. Id. at 850.
232. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 850–51.
233. Id. at 851.
234. Id. (alterations in original).
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Wade’s earnings record.235 The SSA denied the claims both initially and on
reconsideration.236 Although a Social Security ALJ issued a decision granting
the benefits, the SSA’s Appeals Council reversed the ALJ.237
Thereafter, Amy filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas,238 and that court certified the following question
to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: “Does a child, who was created as an
embryo through in vitro fertilization during his parents’ marriage, but
implanted into his mother’s womb after the death of his father, inherit from the
father under Arkansas intestacy law as a surviving child?”239 The Arkansas
Supreme Court answered this question in the negative.240 The Arkansas
intestacy statute provides: “Posthumous descendants of the intestate conceived
before his or her death but born thereafter shall inherit in the same manner as
if born in the lifetime of the intestate.”241
Amy argued that her child was “conceived” when her egg was fertilized by
Wade’s sperm in June 2001, a month before he died and was, therefore, not a
posthumously conceived child.242 The SSA argued that the child “was neither
born nor conceived during Amy and Wade’s marriage, which ended upon
Wade’s death.”243
The Arkansas Supreme Court decided not to decide the meaning of the
term “conceived” under the statute.244 Instead the court reasoned that the
Arkansas General Assembly “did not intend for the statute to permit a child,
created through in vitro fertilization and implanted after the father’s death, to
inherit under intestate succession” because the statute was enacted in 1969—
long before in vitro fertilization was developed.245
This rationale is not terribly convincing. It is akin to saying that the First
Amendment does not apply to speech via radio, television, or the Internet,
simply because those technologies did not exist when the Bill of Rights was
adopted. Equally unconvincing is the court’s discussion of the Arkansas Code
provision addressing artificial insemination of a married woman. The code
states: “Any child conceived following artificial insemination of a married

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 851.
238. Id. at 851.
239. Id. at 850.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 853 (emphasis in original) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (Supp. 2004)).
242. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 851.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 853.
245. Id. 853–54 (citing Dena S. Davis, The Puzzle of IVF, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
275 (2006); Janet L. Dolgin, Surrounding Embryos: Biology, Ideology, & Politics, 16 HEALTH
MATRIX: J.L. & MED. 27 (2006)).
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woman with the consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all
purposes of intestate succession. Consent of the husband is presumed unless
the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence.”246 The court
reasoned that this provision was “inapposite” because it went to the legitimacy
of a child and because it addressed artificial insemination rather than in vitro
fertilization.247 But, unless legitimate children cannot take through intestacy
under Arkansas law, then it is highly relevant that such a child is legitimate.
Moreover, the statute evinces a broader legislative intent that children born
through artificial reproductive technology between a married woman and her
husband be treated as their legitimate offspring. The court’s rationale suggests
that had Wade’s sperm—rather than an embryo—been separately frozen and
used after his death to artificially impregnate Amy, the resulting child would
be legitimate and, presumably, could inherit, unlike the child here. This
appears to be, at best, a classic “distinction without a difference.”
Given the serious problems with the court’s reasoning, it is encouraging
that the opinion ended with a plea to the Arkansas General Assembly “to
revisit the intestacy succession statutes to address the issues involved in the
instant case and those that have not but will likely evolve.”248
Despite the fact that the parties had previously agreed in the federal district
court that the question to be certified to the Arkansas Supreme Court would be
dispositive of the case, Amy nevertheless continued to pursue her claim in
federal court.249 She argued that the Commissioner’s denial of benefits: “(1)
violated her and her son’s rights to equal protection under the 5th and 14th
Amendments; (2) failed to give full faith and credit to the February 14, 2003
Order of the Lonoke County Circuit Court; and (3) was contrary to established
law.”250
Amy asserted two equal protection theories.251 First, she asserted that the
decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Commissioner “created a
whole new class of children who will be deprived of certain rights solely
because they were not conceived and born in a ‘normal’ or ‘accepted’
manner.”252 Second, she asserted that the Social Security Act “deprives her of
equal protection because it incorporates state intestacy law, which creates the
possibility that claimants will be treated differently on a state-by-state
Applying rational basis review,254 the court rejected both
basis.”253
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 854 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(c) (Supp. 2004)).
Id.
Id. at 855.
Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1097–98 (E.D. Ark. 2009).
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1099.
Id.
Id.
Finley, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
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arguments.255 As to the first argument, the court found it rational for the state
not to include as heirs for intestacy purposes children born months or even
years after their father’s death; this reasonably related to “the orderly, timely,
and final disposition of estate property.”256 As to the latter argument, the court
found it rational for Congress to apply state intestacy law, citing authority that
“there is no federal law of domestic relations.”257
Next, the court readily rejected Amy’s full faith and credit argument. The
federal full faith and credit statute258 has been interpreted to “require[] federal
courts to give state court judgments the same preclusive affect those judgments
would be given in the courts of the states rendering them.”259 Here, the
Arkansas Supreme Court had already ruled that Amy’s son could not inherit
from his father’s estate despite the Lonoke County Court paternity
judgment.260
Amy’s third argument—that existing law supports an award of benefits—
largely relied on the decision in Gillett-Netting.261 The court easily disposed of
this argument since Gillett-Netting was based on the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of Arizona law, whereas Amy’s son could not inherit under
Arkansas law as definitively construed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.262
H. Brandalynn Vernoff (California)
California residents, Gabriela and Bruce Vernoff, had been married for
five years when, in July 1995, Bruce suddenly died.263 At Gabriela’s direction,
doctors extracted several sperm samples from Bruce’s cadaver.264 In June
1998, almost three years after Bruce’s death, Gabriela underwent in vitro using
Bruce’s sperm, which resulted in the March 1999 birth of a daughter,
Brandalynn.265 Gabriela filed for child survivor benefits for Brandalynn, along
with a claim for benefits for herself as Brandalynn’s mother.266 The SSA
denied the claims, and a decade-long legal battle ensued.267 While the appeal
was pending, the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in Gillett-Netting,

255. Id. at 1104, 1106.
256. Id. at 1104.
257. Id. at 1105–06 (quoting De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
259. Finley, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (quoting Gas Aggregation Servs., Inc. v. Howard Avista
Energy, LLC, 458 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 2006)).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1106–09.
262. Id. at 1109.
263. Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See id.
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which prompted a remand to the SSA to reconsider the claims in light of that
decision and the SSA’s Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9) implementing that
decision in all Ninth Circuit states, including California.268 The SSA
reaffirmed its denial of the claims in 2006, and the district court upheld that
denial in 2007.269
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Gabriela pressed both her statutory claims
and an Equal Protection claim.270 But, the same court that had granted the
Gillett-Netting claims applying Arizona domestic relations law denied the
Vernoff claims under California law.271 The court noted that while Netting
delayed his cancer treatment in order to deposit sperm for his wife’s later use
and confirmed that he wanted her to use his sperm to have his child, there was
no evidence of Bruce Vernoff’s consent to either the post-mortem harvesting
of his sperm or its subsequent use by his widow to create a child.272
In order for Brandalynn to establish her dependency on the insured, she
needed to: 1) show actual dependency at the time of her father’s death; 2)
satisfy the Gillett-Netting and SSAR requirements by “establishing that the
insured is her ‘parent’ under California law and that she is, therefore, both
legitimate and dependent”; or 3) demonstrate that she could inherit from the
insured under California’s intestacy laws.273
Obviously the first option was not available since Brandalynn was not
conceived at the time of her father’s death.274
The second option also was unavailable. Under California law a man “is
presumed to be the natural parent of a child, . . . if ‘[h]e and the child’s natural
mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death.’”275
Brandalynn was born over three and one-half years after Bruce Vernoff’s
death.276 Bruce had neither received Brandalynn into his home and openly
held her out as his child, nor had he acknowledged paternity.277 No basis
existed under California law to establish Bruce as Brandalynn’s natural parent;
indeed, “California law does not equate natural parent status with biological
parenthood such that a mere biological relationship is sufficient” for natural

268. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105. See supra note 189 (discussing Gillett-Netting and the
acquiescence ruling).
269. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105.
270. Id. at 1104.
271. Id. at 1112.
272. Id. at 1105.
273. Id. at 1106–07 (citing SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005)).
274. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1107.
275. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a)). But see In re Jerry P.,
116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding the underlying statute unconstitutional).
276. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1107.
277. Id. at 1108.
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parent status.278 The court emphasized the lack of consent on the part of
Bruce, the deceased biological father, distinguishing this case from both
Gillett-Netting and Woodward.279 Nor could Brandalynn meet the third option
by demonstrating her ability to inherit from Bruce under the California Probate
Code at the time of Bruce’s death.280
Unable to demonstrate dependency, Gabriela finally argued that the SSA’s
exclusion from benefits of certain posthumously conceived children—
including Brandalynn—violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.281 Relying on Matthews v. Lucas, the court applied rational basis
review and, as in Lucas, found the denial of benefits rational.282 The court
noted that only those children who do not meet the statutory requirements
under California law are excluded, and “the challenged classifications are
reasonably related to the government’s twin interests in limiting benefits to
those children who have lost a parent’s support, and in using reasonable
presumptions to minimize the administrative burden of proving dependency on
a case-by-case basis.”283
I.

B.E. Beeler (Iowa)

The most recent in this line of cases involved an Iowa couple, Patti and
Bruce Beeler.284 In November 2000, while they were engaged to be married,
Bruce was diagnosed with leukemia.285 Bruce postponed chemotherapy
treatments in order to bank sperm for Patti’s future use.286 He signed a form
indicating, “In the event of my death, I wish to bequeath all my banked semen
to my spouse/partner.”287 Bruce and Patti married in December 2000.288
When Bruce reentered the hospital in January 2001, both he and Patti signed a
second form expressing their desire that Patti be inseminated for the purpose of
conceiving a child.289 The form also stated: “Male partner hereby agrees to
accept and acknowledge paternity and child support responsibility of any
resulting child or children.”290 Bruce died in May 2001, and Patti was

278. Id.
279. Id. at 1109–10.
280. Id. at 1110–12.
281. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1112.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Beeler v. Astrue, No. C09-0019, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 12, 2009).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 3–4. Of three copies the laboratory’s version of this form indicated the bequest, as
did one of two patient copies. Id. at 4.
288. Id.
289. Beeler, No. C09-0019, at 4–5.
290. Id. at 5.
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inseminated with his sperm in July 2002.291 A daughter, B.E.B., was born in
April 2003, almost two years after Bruce’s death.292
In June 2003, Patti filed for child’s insurance benefits on behalf of B.E.B.,
and the SSA denied that claim at all four administrative levels.293 In February
2009, Patti sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa.294 In a decision filed in November 2009, the
Magistrate Judge reversed the SSA and directed an award of benefits to B.E.B.
on Bruce’s account.295
The critical issue before the court was whether B.E.B. was the child of the
wage earner within the meaning of the Social Security Act.296 The
Commissioner did not contest that B.E.B. was Bruce’s biological child.297
Relying heavily on Gillett-Netting and the plain meaning of the statute, the
court readily concluded that B.E.B. was Bruce’s child for the purposes of
Social Security.298 Under that authority, a biological child is necessarily a
“child” for SSA purposes.299 Hence, the court deemed it unnecessary to
evaluate whether under Iowa law, B.E.B. was entitled to inherit from Bruce.300
But, even if it were necessary for B.E.B. to demonstrate that she could
inherit from Bruce under Iowa law, she would have met that burden.301 Under
Iowa Code §633.222, a biological child will inherit from her father if either
“(1) the evidence proving paternity is available during the father’s lifetime, or
(2) the child has been recognized by the father as his child.”302 Relying on
Iowa decisional law, the court found that the two forms signed by Bruce, in
combination, satisfied the second part of the test, recognition by the father.303
Finally, the court found that while not actually dependent on Bruce at the
time of his death, B.E.B. was “deemed dependent” on Bruce because under
Iowa law she was his legitimate child.304 Under Iowa Code § 252A.3(4), a
child born to parents who were married “at any time prior or subsequent to the
birth of such a child” is the legitimate child of both parents.305 B.E.B. met this
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 2.
294. Beeler, No. C09-0019, at 2.
295. Id. at 19.
296. Id. at 3.
297. Id. at 8. In fact, DNA testing showed over a 99% probability that Bruce was B.E.B.’s
biological father. Id. at 5 n.11.
298. Id. at 8.
299. Beeeler, No. C09.0019, at 10.
300. Id. at 11.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 12 (quoting IOWA CODE § 633.222 (2007)).
303. Id. at 12–14.
304. Beeeler, No. C09.0019, at 11.
305. Id. at 17 (quoting IOWA CODE § 252A.3(4)).
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standard. Furthermore, because Bruce acknowledged in writing that any child
born to Patti using his sperm would be his child, B.E.B. was also deemed
dependent on Bruce under the Social Security Act.306
As the court concluded that B.E.B. was Bruce’s legitimate child and she
was entitled to benefits on his account; and even if she were not his legitimate
child under state law, she would nonetheless be deemed dependent on Bruce at
the time of his death, and hence eligible for child’s insurance benefits.
III. THE (SOMETIMES) NEBULOUS FAMILY LAW STATUS OF CHILDREN OF
SAME-SEX COUPLES
As the above discussion makes clear, the eligibility of a child conceived by
non-traditional means for Social Security benefits on a parent’s account
implicates a complex interplay of state and federal law, leading to varying
results depending on the specific facts of the case and the state of the child’s
birth. Applying the restrictions of DOMA to children born to—or adopted
by—one member of a same-sex couple adds legal complexity to the potential
detriment of such children.
Where a child is the natural or adopted child of one member of a same-sex
couple and is adopted under state law by the partner of the parent, there should
be no question about that child’s eligibility to claim Social Security benefits on
the account of the adoptive parent.307 Likewise, where both members of a
same-sex couple adopt a child who is not the biological child of either partner,
that child should unquestionably be treated as the legal child of each adopting
parent for Social Security purposes.308 In this regard, it is noteworthy that a
number of states that do not permit same-sex couples to enter into marriage or
legally recognized quasi-marital relationships such as civil unions,
nevertheless, allow them to adopt each other’s child or a third-party child.309
The difficulty occurs where a child being raised by a same-sex couple is
neither the natural nor the adoptive child of one (or both) of them. Thorny
issues have arisen around the United States in the family law context where a
child has been raised by a same-sex couple who later separate and the
biological parent then tries to prevent her ex-partner from having a further
relationship with the child.310 State courts have been divided as to whether the
306. Id. at 18–19 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I) (2006)).
307. 20 C.F.R. § 404.356 (2009).
308. Id.
309. For example, Pennsylvania has a state DOMA prohibiting same-sex marriage and the
recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1102, 1704 (West
1996). Nevertheless, Pennsylvania has recognized the ability of same-sex couples to adopt for
almost a decade. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202–03 (Pa. 2002). See also, e.g.,
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999) (recognizing that Vermont allowed same-sex
couples to adopt long before the litigation that led to civil unions).
310. See infra notes 315–31 and accompanying text.
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former partner who is neither a biological nor adoptive parent has any legal
rights (or duties) vis-à-vis the child.311
The cases are, quite properly, heavily fact-based. Some courts have found
such a former partner to lack standing to assert visitation rights.312 Other
courts have granted the former partner rights using equitable doctrines
including “in loco parentis” or “de facto parent” standing.313
A.

Custody and Visitation Issues

In one Pennsylvania case, Jones v. Jones, the court ultimately awarded
primary physical custody to the “nonbiological”—and non-adoptive—
parent.314 Two women, Patricia and Ellen, lived together as a lesbian couple in
Pennsylvania, starting in 1988.315 They could not enter into a same-sex
marriage or state-recognized quasi-marital relationship under Pennsylvania
law, nor did the record indicate that they did so out-of-state.316 An anonymous
sperm donor was utilized, and Ellen gave birth to twin boys in December
1996.317 The parties lived together until January 2001, when Ellen left their
residence, taking the twins with her.318 The trial judge granted primary
physical custody to Ellen, the biological mother, awarding Patricia “relatively
typical partial custody visitation rights.”319 However, after Ellen engaged in “a
multi-year effort to exclude [Patricia] from the children’s lives” and “tried in
every way possible to sabotage [Patricia’s] relationship with the children,” the
trial court moved primary physical custody of the children to Patricia, their
“non-biological mother.”320 On appeal, Ellen argued that this was error, inter
alia because the trial judge had not found her to be unfit.321 But, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the trial court.322 While the evidentiary

311. See infra notes 315, 328, 333 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 93 (Md. 2008) (finding no standing to
sue for visitation rights as de facto parent). Cf. Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498–99 (Va.
Ct. App. 2008) (refusing to acknowledge partner as de facto parent, but acknowledging standing
as “person of legitimate interest” with burden of showing unfitness of biological parent).
313. See, e.g., SooHoo v. Johnson (In re SooHoo), 731 N.W.2d 815, 822, 826 (Minn. 2007)
(in loco parentis); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000) (de facto); In re M.K.S.-V.,
301 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (finding partner had standing to seek conservatorship).
314. Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 912 A.2d 838
(Pa. 2006).
315. Id. at 917.
316. See supra note 309.
317. Jones, 884 A.2d at 917.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 918–19.
321. Id. at 916.
322. Jones, 884 A.2d at 919.
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scales were tipped hard in favor of a parent in custody litigation, she did not
actually have to be shown to be unfit in order for the non-parent to prevail.323
In other situations, courts have deemed the former partner to be the legal
parent of the other partner’s biological child by virtue of the state-recognized
legal relationship—or former relationship—between the two partners.
Unquestionably, the most notorious of these cases is the bitter and longrunning Miller-Jenkins interstate custody battle between Lisa Miller and her
former partner, Janet Jenkins.324 While residing in Virginia, Miller and
Jenkins entered into a “civil union” in Vermont.325 Miller was subsequently
artificially inseminated and gave birth to a child, Isabella, in April 2002 while
they still lived in Virginia.326 In August 2002, the couple relocated to Vermont
where they raised Isabella together until September 2003, when Miller moved
back to Virginia, taking Isabella with her.327 Miller initially filed in Vermont
to dissolve the civil union, asking the court to award her primary custody and
requesting that the court award Jenkins parent-child contact.328 She later did a
complete about-face and filed in Virginia, asking the Virginia court to declare
that Jenkins had no parental rights.329
Meanwhile, in the ongoing Vermont litigation, the Vermont court held that
Jenkins had parental rights vis-à-vis Isabella by virtue of the Vermont Civil
Union law.330 When the Virginia trial court ruled that Jenkins had no parental
or visitation rights, a direct interstate conflict was created.331
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that the
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) barred the Virginia trial
court from exercising jurisdiction over the custody claim.332 The court of
appeals rejected the natural mother’s claim that DOMA somehow superseded
the PKPA with regard to children of same-sex couples.333 As in the
Pennsylvania case of Jones v. Jones, the Vermont trial court ultimately ordered
primary custody to be changed from the natural mother to the non-biological
mother, after it became clear that the natural mother would ignore visitation

323. Id. at 918. Interestingly, the Superior Court referred to Patricia in different parts of its
opinion as a “non-biological parent” and as a “third party” who was a “non-parent.” Id. at 916,
918.
324. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008); Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006).
325. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 957 (Vt. 2006).
331. See id.
332. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332.
333. Id. at 336.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

844

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:811

orders and prevent the non-biological mother from having a relationship with
the child.334
B.

Support Issues

In addition to the troubling question of whether a non-adopting, former
same-sex partner of a parent has parental rights vis-à-vis the child, there is the
additional question of whether that former partner has a financial obligation to
the child under state law, which might satisfy the dependency requirement
under the Social Security Act. Under certain circumstances, a state court may
impose liability for support on the former partner, either applying statutory
law, common law, or equitable principles.335 If the state statute—whether a
same-sex marriage act, civil union, or related law—provides for such liability,
then it is a straightforward matter of statutory construction, assuming the
parties had entered into such a legally recognized relationship. But, if not, the
questions become more complex, and the states are divided.
In a 2001 case, D.R.M., the Washington Court of Appeals found that a
woman had no liability to support the child of her same-sex former domestic
partner.336 Anne and Kelly had lived together starting in 1992, but had “never
attempted to marry, nor did they ever participate in any type of union
ceremony or commitment ceremony.”337 The trial court, however, “found that
the parties’ actions were consistent with a marriage.”338 They sought out
medical assistance together with an aim toward having Kelly get pregnant by
artificial insemination and give birth to a child that Anne would later adopt.339
Kelly ultimately received artificial insemination treatments; Anne was present
for the doctor’s appointments.340
The treatments were successful, but before the women knew that Kelly
was pregnant, their relationship fell apart.341 Kelly gave birth to a baby girl in
June 1997.342 Anne made some voluntary support payments to Kelly both
334. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03, at 19 (Vt. Rutland Cnty. Fam. Ct. Nov.
20, 2009), aff’d, 2010 Vt. 98 (Vt. 2010). At this writing, the natural mother has not complied
with the order to turn over custody, and the trial court has issued a warrant for her arrest. See
Arrest Warrant Issued in Lesbian Parent Custody Case, ADVOCATE.COM (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://www.Advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2010/02/23/Arrest_Warrant_in_lesbian_parent_cus
tody_case/.
335. See Caroline P. Blair, Note, It’s More Than a One-Night Stand: Why a Promise to
Parent Should Obligate a Former Lesbian Partner to Pay Child Support in the Absence of a
Statutory Requirement, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 465, 475 (2006).
336. State ex rel. D.R.M., 34 P.3d 887, 894 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
337. Id. at 890.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. D.R.M., 34 P.3d at 890.
342. See id.
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before and after the birth of the child.343 Kelly, however, did not go forward
with efforts to arrange a co-parenting plan or adoption by Anne.344 When
Kelly went on public assistance, the state sued Anne for support payment, and
Kelly filed a separate action against Anne, which was consolidated for trial
with the first action.345 The trial court denied relief in both actions, and the
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed.346
The Court of Appeals recognized that a parent may be either biological or
adoptive.347 Anne was neither.348 The court found no requirement under
Washington law that a child have two parents.349 The court likewise rejected a
duty of support based on theories of “intended parent,”350 estoppel,351 and
breach of promise.352
The following year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied the doctrine
of equitable estoppel to uphold a support duty placed on the non-adopting
same-sex former partner of a lesbian mother.353 In the case of H.A.N. v. L.S.K.,
a lesbian couple had decided to have children together.354 L.S.K. ultimately
had five children—a single child, followed by quadruplets—through artificial
insemination by anonymous sperm donors.355 When the quadruplets were four
years old, the parties separated and L.S.K. moved across the country with the
children.356 Although she never adopted the children, H.A.N. sued L.S.K. for
custodial rights; L.S.K. responded with a complaint against H.A.N. for child
support.357 The two lawsuits proceeded down parallel tracks. H.A.N. won
shared legal and partial physical custody of the children while denying any
obligation to support them.358 The trial court ruled that H.A.N. could not have
it both ways: by her conduct she was estopped from claiming she was not
liable for child support.359

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 890–91.
D.R.M., 34 P.3d at 891, 898.
Id. at 891.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 894.
D.R.M., 34 P.3d at 897.
Id. at 898.
L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 877–79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
Id. at 874.
Id. at 874–75.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 874–75.
L.S.K., 813 A.2d at 874–75.
Id. at 875–76.
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, applying the doctrine of
equitable estoppel.360 It found that unlike a stepparent who steps into the role
of parent to pre-existing children, H.A.N. committed herself to a course of
conduct with L.S.K. that brought these five children into being.361
Yet another layer of complexity may be involved where a same-sex couple
has a child using a known sperm donor or surrogate mother. This gives rise to
the possibility of more than two persons asserting parental rights, or having
parental duties, toward the same child. Such a scenario came to fruition in
Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, decided by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in 2007.362
Two Pennsylvania women, Jodilynn and Jennifer, had entered into a civil
union in Vermont.363 Jodilynn had two children by a known sperm donor,
Carl, who was involved with the children’s lives from their birth.364 After
Jodilynn left the relationship, her former partner, Jennifer, commenced custody
litigation which ultimately resulted in all three adults—Jodilynn, Jennifer and
Carl—having various custodial rights toward the children.365 When Jodilynn
sued Jennifer for child support, Jennifer did not deny liability but asked the
trial court to join Carl as a party defendant who was also liable for child
support since he was “essentially a third parent.”366 The trial court denied
joinder, and Jennifer appealed.367
The appellate court reversed, distinguishing the case from L.S.K. since in
this case the lesbian ex-partner was not contesting her own child support
liability and the natural father had voluntarily made significant financial
contributions to the children already.368 However, the appellate court did apply
one principle from L.S.K. to the case: estoppel.369 Since Carl had custodial
rights based on his biological parenthood, it would be fundamentally unfair for
him to disclaim financial responsibility.370 The result—apparently unique in

360. Id. at 877–78. Estoppel applies to “prevent[] one from asserting a claim or right that
contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally established as true.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (8th ed. 2004).
361. L.S.K., 813 A.2d at 877.
362. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
363. Id. at 476.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Jacob, 923 A.2d at 476.
368. Id. at 480–82.
369. Id. at 480.
370. Id. at 480.
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the law of the United States371—was three individuals with parental rights and
responsibilities.372
The Jacob decision leads directly to the possibility that the SSA could be
obligated to pay survivor’s benefits to a child if any one of three parental
figures were to die, surely a thought that would alarm any SSA actuary.
Indeed, in an ironic twist, Carl died before the appellate decision was
announced, and apparently the children began receiving Social Security
survivor’s benefits on his account.373
IV. DOMA’S IMPACT ON NON-BIOLOGICAL, NON-ADOPTED CHILDREN OF
ONE MEMBER OF SAME-SEX COUPLES
DOMA has compelled the SSA to confront the issue of whether a nonbiological and non-adoptive child of a person who is, or has been, a member of
a same-sex couple may be eligible for survivor’s or disability benefits on the
account of that parental figure where the parent-child relationship is
established by a state same-sex marriage (or quasi-marriage) law. For
example, in the bitter Vermont-Virginia interstate custody battle between Lisa
Miller and Janet Jenkins, the Vermont courts declared Isabella to be the legal
child of her non-biological, non-adopting parent by virtue of Vermont’s (now
superseded) Civil Union law.374 Normally, if a parent with an adequate Social
Security earnings record becomes disabled, her child will be entitled to
disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act as an
“auxiliary beneficiary.”375 And, as discussed in Parts I and II, if that parent
dies, her dependent child will be entitled to survivor’s benefits.376 But, if the
parent-child relationship is created by a state’s same-sex marriage (or quasimarriage) law, would payment of benefits to the child contravene DOMA’s
mandate that for all federal purposes, “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
wife?”377 The federal government has given inconsistent answers to this
question and, to date, it is not clearly resolved.

371. However, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Canada, has reached a similar result in A.A.
v. B.B., 2007 ONCA 2 (CanLII).
372. For an in-depth analysis of Jacob, see Robert E. Rains, Case Commentary, Three
Parents?, 20 DENNING L.J. 197 (2008).
373. Id. at 204 n.48.
374. See supra notes 20, 324–34 and accompanying text.
375. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (2010). While the term “auxiliary beneficiary” is not defined in this
chapter, 20 C.F.R. Section 229.48 in the same title states “auxiliary beneficiary (spouse and
children).” Id. § 229.48(d).
376. Id. § 404.350. See discussion supra Parts I, II.
377. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
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In July 2004, shortly after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled
that Massachusetts must permit same-sex marriage,378 the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) issued a Report for Congress entitled, “The Effect of
State-Legalized Same-Sex Marriage on Social Security Benefits and
Pensions.”379 That report, while not directly addressing the status of the child
of a state-recognized same-sex marriage, made clear that DOMA requires that,
“the legalization of same-sex marriage at the state level has no effect in
determining the validity of marriage for Social Security purposes.”380
If taken to its logical extension, the CRS Report would preclude benefits
for the non-biological and non-adoptive child of a same-sex parent whose
parental rights are based on legal recognition of a same-sex relationship.
However, after the decision of the Vermont Supreme Court in Miller-Jenkins
in 2006 that the child born to one member of a civil union is the legal child of
the other member, the SSA sought further guidance from the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) of the United States Justice Department.381 The resulting OLC
opinion, issued in October 2007, found no preclusive effect mandated by
DOMA:
A child’s inheritance rights under state law may be independent of the
existence of a marriage or spousal relationship, and that is indeed the case in
Vermont. Accordingly, we conclude that nothing in DOMA would prevent the
non-biological child of a partner in a Vermont civil union from receiving CIB
382
[child’s insurance benefits] under the Social Security Act.

The OLC opinion went on to apply this conclusion to a specific claim then
pending before the SSA. Two women, identified in the opinion as Karen and
Monique, entered into a civil union in Vermont in 2002.383 Monique bore a
son, Elijah, in 2003.384 Although Karen did not adopt Elijah, his birth
certificate listed her as his “2nd parent;” other documents used the term “civil
union parent.”385 In 2005, the SSA found Karen to be disabled and she filed
for auxiliary benefits for Elijah as her dependent child.386

378. Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
379. LAURA HALTZEL & PATRICK PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21897, THE
EFFECT OF STATE-LEGALIZED SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ON SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AND
PENSIONS (2004).
380. Id. at 2.
381. Whether the Defense of Marriage Act Precludes the Non-biological Child of a Member
of a Vermont Civil Union from Qualifying for Child’s Insurance Benefits under the Social
Security Act, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 n.1 (2007) [hereinafter DOMA Preclusion].
382. Id. at 1.
383. Id. at 2.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. DOMA Preclusion, supra note 381, at 2.
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One interesting aspect of the OLC opinion is that it explicitly provided
that, “[b]ecause Karen was domiciled in Vermont at the time of Elijah’s
application, we look to Vermont law for guidance.”387 This suggests that a
parent could potentially “game the system” by moving to a state like Vermont
before filing an application for his or her child.
Applying Vermont law to the issue of Elijah’s relationship with Karen, the
OLC opinion readily concluded that, in light of Miller-Jenkins, “Vermont law
would recognize Elijah as Karen’s child for purposes of his right to inherit,
should she die intestate.”388
The OLC opinion then turned to whether DOMA would bar SSA from
recognizing that state-created relationship. The OLC rather elliptically
concluded that it would not.
By its terms, 1 U.S.C. § 7 does not apply to Elijah’s eligibility for CIB
under the Social Security Act. As discussed, Elijah’s eligibility arises out of
his status as Karen’s “child” under section 416, and the law provides that he
“shall be deemed such” simply because he “would have the same status
relative to taking intestate personal property as a child” under Vermont law.
That analysis does not require any interpretation of the words “marriage” or
“spouse” under the Social Security Act or any other provision of federal law.
Nor does the analysis even require interpreting those terms under Vermont law
in a way that might have consequence for the administration of federal
benefits. An individual may qualify as a “child” under section 416 wholly
apart from the existence of any marriage at all, as would be the case of a
natural-born child of an unmarried couple, or, as is the case here, where
Vermont recognizes a parent-child relationship outside the context of marriage.
The fact that Elijah’s right of inheritance ultimately derives from Vermont’s
recognition of a same-sex civil union is simply immaterial under DOMA.
Accordingly, DOMA would not preclude Elijah from qualifying for CIB as a
389
child of Karen under the Social Security Act.

Since the SSA had informed the OLC in advance that it would be bound by
the OLC’s opinion,390 one might have thought the issue to have been resolved.
But it was not.
In late May 2008, Florida resident Gary Day sued the SSA through the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the SSA to
make a decision on his application for child’s insurance benefits, which he
filed in February 2006 for his two children.391 In January 2008, the SSA had
ruled that Day was disabled within the meaning of Title II of the Social
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1 n.1.
Complaint at 1, 6, Day v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:08-CV-00896 (D.D.C. May 28, 2008).
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Security Act with an onset date of June 23, 2003.392 Day was listed as a parent
of each child on that child’s California birth certificate and had obtained orders
from the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles
establishing his parental rights as to each child.393 The Complaint rather
obliquely asserted that “[n]either of the Judgments Establishing Parental Rights
was based on any presumption in, nor operation of, California law respecting
the relationship between Plaintiff Gary Day and any other adult person.”394
In August 2008, the SSA issued an Emergency Message Policy Instruction
to its internal units, citing the October 2007 OLC opinion and directed that if a
claim is made for auxiliary benefits for a child, the claim must be submitted for
a legal opinion to the Regional Chief Counsel, “if the NH (Number Holder) is
not the biological parent and a parental relationship is alleged based upon . . . a
same-sex marriage, civil union, or other legal relationship, such as a domestic
partnership.”395 Some eight months later, in April 2009, the SSA sent a letter
to Gary Day’s attorneys indicating that the SSA would award child’s benefits
to his children.396 This good news for the children arrived three years and
three months after Day filed the applications for benefits for them.
V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
No matter what one’s views on DOMA and same-sex relationships and, for
that matter, the creation of children by such nontraditional methods as postmortem conception, it is past time for both the state and federal governments to
directly address these matters through a child-centered approach. Continuing
to evade legislative responsibility at the state and federal levels has not
stopped—and will not stop—children from being conceived through nontraditional means and being born into non-traditional families. Punishing such
children by denying them benefits to which other children would be entitled
may save small amounts of public money, but it is hardly sound public policy.
Nor would recognizing the rights of such children likely “open the floodgates”
to a massive raid on the public fisc. The following proposals flow from these
principles:

392. Id. at 6.
393. Id. at 4, 5.
394. Id. at 5. While those judgments are not attached to the Complaint, it is a reasonable
inference that the children were the result of a surrogacy arrangement in California using Day’s
partner’s sperm.
395. SSA EM-08080 (Aug. 1, 2008).
396. See Erin Baer, Social Security Administration to Provide Benefits in Lambda Legal Case
Representing Gay Father’s Children, LAMBDA LEGAL (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.lambda
legal.org/news/pr/pr_ssa-to-provide-benefits-in-lambda-legal-case-representing-gay-fatherschildren.html.
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1. Congress should amend DOMA397 to provide that it shall not be
construed to deny benefits to children who are the legal or equitable children of
wage earners.
2. State legislatures should amend their parentage laws to provide that
where two adults take—or cause to have taken—medical steps with the
intention of creating a child that they intend to raise, they are both the legal
parents of the resulting child or children with full parental rights and
responsibilities.398
3. State legislatures should enact provisions akin to Article 8 of the
Uniform Parentage Act (2000),399 providing for the ability to have surrogacy
agreements approved by a court before conception, with the court entering an
order at that time identifying the legal parents of any child resulting from the
surrogacy.400
4. Finally, in all cases where the legal choice is between a minor child
having one legal parent or two, all doubts should be resolved in favor of there
being two adults with legal rights and responsibilities toward that child.401
And, if that means that the child would become eligible for Social Security
benefits on the second parent’s earnings record, that is a price that we, as a
society, should be collectively willing to pay.

397. This Article purposefully takes no position on whether DOMA should be repealed in
whole or in part, but simply assumes it will remain federal law.
398. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1412–
13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that former husband and wife who had entered into a surrogacy
agreement using donor sperm were legal parents of resulting child who was not biologically
related to either of them).
399. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 801–809 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 362–69 (Supp.
2010).
400. See generally Rains, supra note 108, at 34.
401. This position is contrary to that taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Ferguson v.
McKiernan, where the court found a known sperm donor to a separated and later divorced woman
to have no legal responsibilities to the resulting child. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236,
1242, 1248 (Pa. 2007) (enforcing a non-parentage agreement between donor and birth mother).
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